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Remarks of Dolores S. Smith
Dolores S. Smith'

Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) gives
consumers new rights, both to learn about and to control the sharing
of personal information by their financial institutions. 2 Title V directs
the Board and other Federal agencies to issue implementing3
regulations, and to make these regulations as consistent as possible.
In keeping with this mandate, the Board and the other Federal
banking agencies jointly issued final regulations on June 1, 2000. 4
To provide context for our discussion of consumer financial
privacy, I will give some background about the topic. Then, turning
specifically to the GLBA and the banking agencies' regulations, I will
highlight several issues regarding consumer financial privacy that the
legislation raised and the regulations resolved.
I. BACKGROUND
One might well ask: Why are consumer privacy protections
included in a financial modernization law? One explanation is that in
recent years concerns about consumer financial privacy have become
increasingly prominent in the media, among members of the public,
the financial industry, and the Congress.5 For example, privacy
figures increasing on the editorial and "op-ed" pages of newspapers as
an important public policy issue. Recent surveys show that identity

Ms. Smith's remarks, delivered March 28, 2000, have been updated to take
account of subsequent events, through the issuance of final regulations under the
consumer financial privacy provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
2 See Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. § 6801.
3 See 15 U.S.C. § 6804.
4 See Banks and Banking, 12 C.F.R. § 216 (2001).
5 See, e.g., Joseph B. Cahill, Banks Release of Client Data is Examined,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 1999.

6See Paul Gigot, Editorial,PrivatelyHeld Concerns, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27,

1999.

105

106

N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.

[Vol. XVII

of personal information is among
theft associated with the disclosure
7
consumers' leading concerns.

The increasing prominence of privacy concerns, in turn, is
related to a number of factors. I will mention some of them. One is
the European Union ("EU") directive on privacy.8 The directive was
adopted in 1995 and was followed by negotiations, highly publicized
in some sectors, between U.S. officials and EU representatives. At
issue was whether U.S. laws provide privacy protections sufficiently
comparable to those established by the EU. At stake was the need to
ensure that U.S. firms are not placed at a competitive disadvantage by
being barred from receiving consumer information from member
countries of the EU. U.S. and EU officials agreed on "Safe Harbor
Principles" that would permit compliant U.S. firms to do business in
Europe without being barred from receiving consumer information.
A second factor is consumers' growing use of the Internet.
This use has been accompanied by industry efforts to collect data
about consumers and about their Internet activities. There is a
corresponding rise in consumers' concerns about the confidentiality of
financial data that they provide and that are captured and transmitted
on-line; and growing interest on the part of Federal agencies about the
practices that financial institutions follow with respect to customer
privacy. 9 In 1999, the four bank and thrift regulators surveyed the
privacy disclosures posted at the Web sites of the institutions they
Commission surveyed
regulate. Earlier this year, the Federal Trade
10
generally.
more
disclosures
on-line privacy
7 See American Opinion (A Special Report): Bright Past Kindles America's
Hope, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 1999 (publishing results of a Wall Street Journal/NBC Poll
that Americans cite loss of personal privacy as their utmost concern about the future,
ahead of overpopulation, terrorism, and global warming).
8 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 of
Oct. 1995 (OJ 1995 L 281/31) (governing the protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data and the free movement of such data).
9 Amber Veverka, FederalAgencies Schedule Public Comment on BankingPrivacy Law, KNIGHT RIDDER/TRIB. Bus. NEWS, Jan. 22, 2000 (explaining legislators'

renewed interest in privacy protection).
10 See Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the

Marketplace: Hearings before Fed Trade Comm.,
Robert Pitofsky, Chairman of the Fed. Trade Comm.).

Electronic

10 6 th Cong. (2000) (statement of
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Third, in 1999 Minnesota's Attorney General sued U.S.
Bancorp, alleging that its information sharing practices violated state
This high-profile lawsuit spotlighted financial
and federal law. 1
disclosure practices on the part of banks that were a surprise to many
of us. Until then a general assumption was that our financial records,
were, for the most part, kept confidential by banks.12 Instead, we
learned that U.S. Bank, and others, were routinely selling consumer
data to telemarketers and other third parties. More recently, the
Attorney General of New York expressed similar privacy-related

concerns to the Chase Manhattan Corporation. 13 Mr. Mindell, on our
panel today, represented the Attorney General of New York regarding

this matter. 14 I look forward to hearing from him about it.
Fourth, financial modernization and consumer privacy are two
sides of the same coin. The GLBA enables financial institutions to
diversify their activities.

To attain the maximum benefit from this

diversification, institutions want to expand their collection, analysis,
and use of consumer data.15 Indeed, one of the main incentives for
financial and non-financial firms to affiliate is to pool their consumer
data to gain economies of scale from investments in information

11See generally, David Ramp, Minnesota Settles With U.S. Bancorp,
TELEMARKETING FRAUD BULLETIN, Aug. 1999 at 1; see also Michael Sisk, Data
Management: Consumer PrivacyMoves to the Forefront,FUTURE BANKER, Sept. 6, 1999,
at 42 (citing the complaint alleging violations of the Fair Credit Report Act and
fraudulent and deceptive practices).
12See Ron Insana, Many People Are Not Aware that Banks Sometimes Give
Out PersonalFinancialInformation to Companies, CNBC TRANSCRIPTS, Aug. 4, 1999
(identifying seventy-nine-year-old Albert Newman, bank consumer, who was unaware of
his bank's practice).
13Winnie Hu, Chase Bank Agrees to Stop Sharing Data, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
26, 2000 at B1; see also Press Release, Office of the N.Y. State Attorney General Eliot
Spitzer, Spitzer Secures Privacy Agreement with Nat'l Bank (Jan. 25, 2000) available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us (describing the Chase Manhattan case).
14Press Release, Office of the N.Y. State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer,
Spitzer Secures Privacy Deal with National Bank (Jan. 25, 2000) available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us.
15See The Privacy Revolution FIN. SERVICES ALERT (Goodwin, Procter &
Hoar, LLP, US).
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technology, and to cross-market products more effectively.' 6 These
developments, naturally, sharpen consumers' concerns about the
privacy of their financial data.
Lastly, financial privacy is an issue that legislators find
themselves responding to, not just as Members of Congress, but also,
as consumers. For example, last year, as the House Committee on
Banking and Financial Services was marking up H.R. 10, a
predecessor to the GLBA, a privacy amendment was introduced,
permitting customers to opt out of certain information sharing.' 7 In
debating the amendment, many Committee members realized,
perhaps for the first time, that their own financial data were largely
unprotected by federal law. 8 Although the amendment was not
adopted at the time, it raised Members' consciousness, and privacy19
protections became a necessary adjunct to financial reform.
Ultimately, consumer privacy protections became an important point
of negotiation among Members of Congress as the banking reform
legislation advanced.
II. LEGISLATION
The statutory provisions contained in the GLBA relate to a
number of different aspects of consumer financial privacy. Besides
giving consumers new rights to learn about and control data-sharing
in their relationships with financial institutions, the Act directs the
Federal banking agencies to set standards for the security,
confidentiality, and integrity of customer data held by financial

16See Robert Dodge, Congress Considers How Companies Are Using Your

Data, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, June 8, 1999 at 6D (citing how companies may form
conglomerates to use consumer data).
17145 CONG. REC. H 5305 (March 10, 1999).
"8See id.

19See Bryan Amendment No. 316 (proposed 1999) (amending Title VIIFinancial Information Privacy to permit customers to opt out of sharing of confidential
information).
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institutions.2 ° It seeks to combat "pretext calling," which is the
practice of fraudulently obtaining customer information from a
financial institution (or even from the customer).2 ' It reinstates the
banking agencies' authority to enforce the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA), which governs the disclosure of information to, and by,
consumer reporting agencies. 22 The Act also calls for the Department
of the Treasury (in conjunction with other agencies, including the
Board) to study the sharing of consumer data among affiliated
financial institutions.2 3
At this point, let me interject a reminder: The privacy
provisions we are discussing restrict only the sharing of information
with nonaffiliated third parties. In 1996, the Congress amended the
FCRA to provide, that an institution can share consumer reports with
its affiliates without incurring the responsibilities of a consumer
reporting agency (which could be onerous), so long as the institution
gives the consumer the opportunity to opt out of the institution's
intended sharing of information. 24 This state of affairs continues
under the GLBA. And neither the FCRA nor the privacy provisions
of the GLBA give consumers an opt-out right with respect to an
institution's sharing of "transaction or experience information" with
its affiliates. An example of "transaction or experience information"
is the payment record on a consumer's credit account with the
institution that is sharing the information.2 5

20 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 6801 (a), (b) (West Supp.

2000) (directing financial institutions to set standards regarding privacy and security of
customer personal information).
21See id at § 6821 (making it a violation to fraudulently obtain or disclose
information held by a financial institution, relating to another person).

22See Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (FCRA) 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (a)

(West 1999).

23 See 15 U.S.C.A. at § 6808 (a) (2000) (studying the purposes, risks and

benefits of information sharing among financial affiliates).
24 See 15 U.S.C.A. at § 6802 (b) (2000).
25
id.
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III. REGULATIONS
In turning to the specifics of the regulations, let me say that
because the Act is very complex in some areas, so are the regulations.
Accordingly, what follows is, in some respects, a simplification of the
regulations.
The regulations establish several basic duties. z6 First, a
financial institution must refrain, under certain circumstances, from
disclosing "nonpublic personal information" about a consumer to a
nonaffiliated third party, unless the financial institution has given the
consumer specified notices about its privacy policies and about the
consumer's right to opt out, together with a reasonable opportunity to
opt out, and the consumer has not opted out. 27 Second, a financial
institution receiving nonpublic personal information from a
nonaffiliated third party may re-disclose, or re-use it, only in certain
ways. 28 Third, subject to some limited exceptions, a financial
institution must not disclose credit card and certain other account
numbers to nonaffiliated third parties for use in telemarketing, directmail marketing, or marketing by e-mail. Lastly, again subject to
limited exceptions, a financial institution must notify a customer
about the institution's privacy policies no later than when the
institution establishes the customer relationship,
and no less than
29
annually while the relationship continues.
The agencies addressed many issues in crafting the regulations
that set forth these duties. I will highlight five issues.
First, how much of the data obtained by a financialinstitution
is subject to consumer choice and control? This broad issue involved
several sub-issues. One was: does the Act give consumers noticeand-opt out rights only over data that are thought to be "intrinsically
financial," or also over other data obtained by a financial institution in
connection with providing a financial product or service? The
26 See §§ 6802-6803 (2000) (establishing opt-out right and disclosure

obligations).
See § 6802 (a) (2000).
id. at (c) (placing limits on the reuse of information).
29 Id. (discussing the privacy policies of Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
27

28 See

Act); see also Ted Dreyer, PrivacyMatters, NAT'L L. J., vol. 22, no. 48, B6 (July 2000).
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regulations interpret the Act as protecting not only data about matters
involving money, but also as protecting other information obtained by
the financial institution in the course of providing a financial product
or service.3°
Second, under the statute, the consumer's rights generally do
not extend to information that is "publicly available." But, what does
that term mean? The agencies concluded that it means information
that the institution has a reasonable basis to believe is lawfully
available to the general public. 31 The regulations specify three
sources of this information: government records, widely distributed
media, and disclosures to the general public that are mandated by
law. 32 Let us take an example involving a widely distributed medium:
the telephone book. Given the existence of unlisted numbers, an
institution could treat a consumer's telephone number as publicly
available information if the institution has located the telephone
number in the telephone book, or if the consumer has informed the
institution that the telephone number is not unlisted. But an
institution could not reasonably believe that all telephone numbers are
available to the public.
A third sub-issue was whether the Act gives consumers the
rights over only the data they provide once an account has been
opened or a loan extended. The regulations take a broader approach,
so that consumers' rights also apply to information provided in an
application.
And a fourth sub-issue was: does the Act give consumers
rights over the presence of their names on a customer list disclosed by
a financial institution? The regulations generally answer "yes,"
meaning that most lists of customer names may be disclosed only if
the customers
whose names are included receive notice and the right
33
to opt out.

30 Michael Nelson, First Annual Institute on Privacy Law: Strategies for
Legal Compliance in a High Tech and Changing Regulatory Environment, 607 PLI/PAT

231, 343 (2000).
31Id. at 340; See also 12 C.F.R. § 3 (p).
32 12 C.F.R. § 216.3 (p).
33 Id. at § 216.3 (n).
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A second major issue was: who must receive notice? The Act
makes clear that financial institutions must provide notice to
consumers who enter into (or who are in) continuing relationships
with the institutions.
What about other consumers, such as
individuals who engage in isolated transactions with a financial
institution? For example, is an individual who buys a teller's check
from a bank entitled to a privacy notice, regardless of whether the
bank discloses data about the consumer, and regardless of whether the
bank and the individual have a continuing relationship?
The
regulations say34that, in such cases, the individual is not entitled to a
privacy notice.
Third, when are financial institutions required to provide a
consumer with a privacy notice? The regulations balance the interests
of consumers and financial institutions in this regard.35
The
regulations generally require institutions to provide notices before
disclosing data or establishing a continuing relationship. Institutions
must provide notices long enough before disclosing data, to afford
consumers a reasonable opportunity to opt out. 36 But institutions need
not provide privacy notices far in advance of establishing a customer
relationship. For example, they need not attach privacy notices to
their credit card "take one" applications made available at retail stores
and other locations. Moreover, in some limited circumstances, such
as when institutions acquire deposit accounts without the
accountholders' approval, they may provide privacy notices after the
customer relationship has been established.3 7
Fourth, what should be the content of privacy notices? The
agencies had to decide whether privacy notices should be very
cursory, very detailed, or something in between. The regulations take
a middle course, requiring that consumers receive needed information
while mitigating information overload. For example, the statute
generally requires that an institution's privacy notice identify the
categories of persons to whom the institution discloses nonpublic
34

Id. at § 216.4 (b).

" Id. at § 216.4 (a).
36Id.

312 C.F.R. §216.4 (e).
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personal information. The regulations reflect this requirement
without, however, mandating that the categorization be excessively
detailed.38 An institution need only identify three categories of
recipients, and provide a few examples of each category.
Fifth, how many different ways of opting out must a financial
institution provide, and how user-friendly must they be? Again, the

agencies struck a balance, permitting financial institutions to provide
single means of opting out, so long as it is reasonable for the
consumer to whom it is provided. 39 The regulations offer examples of
what is deemed reasonable, including check-off boxes in prominent
locations on application forms accompanying a notice of the right to
opt out. The regulations also provide examples of means not
considered reasonable; for example, an institution could not require a
consumer to compose and send a 4letter
to an institution setting forth
0
the consumer's decision to opt out.
Besides issuing the regulations that I have been discussing, the
Federal Reserve Board and other agencies have many additional
privacy-related responsibilities: implementing those regulations,
issuing regulations under the FCRA, setting standards for the
protection of consumer data, combating pretext calling, and so on. 4 1
Our fulfillment of these responsibilities will benefit from your
questions and comments. We look forward to receiving them.

38 12 C.F.R. § 216.6.

'91d. at § 216.7.
40 id.
41See Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. § 6801.

